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Summary 
This paper reviews the evidence of how the welfare state can shape the 
relationship between economic inequality and poverty through the channels 
of taxes, transfers and public good provision. In particular, we examine 
how the quantity, and to some extent the quality, of resources that can be 
raised to tackle poverty may be influenced or constrained by high levels of 
inequality. 
 
Through raising taxes for the government to spend, the welfare state 
is by definition redistributive. However, social and political pressures can 
constrain the extent to which it reduces poverty and inequality. In particular, 
a variety of channels exist through which economic inequality may generate 
pressures on the resources available to tackle poverty. Some of these 
channels have a subjective basis, such as subconscious biases in how 
people perceive the economic distribution and their place in it, and 
conscious beliefs and attitudes towards the poor and towards redistribution. 
Redistributive policies rely on public support from the electorate, and if 
public support is low then this can constrain the effective amount of 
resources available for redistribution and social expenditure available to 
tackle poverty. Some of these attitudinal channels also stem from objective 
circumstances, such as social and geographical segregation. 
 
Other channels work through observed decisions and behaviour, in 
particular those of governments and wealthy individuals. The level of 
inequality is reflected in the power of those at the top of the economic 
distribution to influence these government decisions in ways that constrain 
its capacity to redistribute. This could be directly through funding particular 
political agendas, and indirectly through withholding government revenue 
through tax evasion. In this way, the political economy effects of high levels 
of inequality in society can influence the resource constraints on 
government decisions regarding welfare targeting, decentralisation, budget 
cuts, and representation of voter interests. These in turn can all impact on 
the effectiveness of poverty alleviation. 
 
While the net effect of these channels on efforts to tackle poverty are 
not clear-cut, it seems on balance that high inequality tips many of these 
channels in a direction that constrains the redistributive powers of 
governments and their poverty alleviation efforts. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper forms part of a series of papers reviewing the evidence of 
mechanisms that can shape the relationship between economic inequality 
and poverty. In this paper we focus on the welfare state through the 
channels of taxes, transfers and public good provision, and in particular 
how the quantity, and to some extent the quality, of resources that can be 
raised to tackle poverty may be influenced or constrained by high levels of 
inequality. 
 
The functions of a country's welfare state include providing social 
protection, health, education and training, housing, social services, 
pensions, and policies that affect earnings capacity and the structure of the 
labour market (Esping-Andersen and Myles, 2009). Through raising taxes 
for the government to spend, the welfare state is by definition redistributive. 
However, not all of this redistributive activity reduces poverty and 
inequality. Following Barr (2001), the first function of the welfare state is 
to act as a collective “piggy bank”, helping individuals insure against 
various risks over their lifetimes through alternate periods of want and 
plenty (Rowntree, 1902). Through this function, wealthier households can 
receive a similar amount of support over their lifetimes as the less well-off, 
benefitting to a greater extent from, for example, higher education 
spending, tax breaks on savings and the NHS over longer life expectancies 
of the wealthy (Hills, 2014). The second function of the welfare state is to 
reduce welfare disparities over the economic distribution and reduce 
poverty by supporting low-income families through, for example, income 
support, tax credits and unemployment benefits. It is the progressivity of 
the tax and transfer system that largely shapes the degree of this vertical 
redistribution to the least well-off. 
 
While a progressive tax system attempts to reduce poverty by 
limiting the tax incidence of people who are less able to pay, this does not 
guarantee that the poor are always better off than in a less progressive 
system (Higgins and Lustig, 2016). For example, a more progressive 
system generates stronger incentives among the rich to evade income and 
wealth taxes, reducing the ability of the government to raise tax revenue 
for welfare state spending (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002). In an unequal 
society with high concentrations of wealth at the top, this incentive is even 
greater among the wealthiest since these individuals stand to gain 
disproportionately from reducing their tax liabilities. 
 
This, and other types of incentives, behaviours and perceptions can 
serve to constrain the capacity of governments to redistribute in a way that 
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effectively tackles poverty. This paper provides a discussion of how high 
levels of inequality can lead to such constraints, what these constraints 
might be and how they provide mechanisms through which income 
inequality may influence levels of poverty in a society. In section 2 we look 
at how misperceptions, and specifically underestimations, of inequality can 
constrain the level of demand for redistribution and consequently the 
resources available to help the less well-off. Section 3 discusses how 
inequality tends to be accompanied by different types of segregation, which 
can in turn generate hostile attitudes towards the poor and towards 
redistribution. Section 4 investigates the decentralisation of tax-setting 
powers to local government, and how this can limit the ability of poorer 
areas to raise resources to tackle poverty. Finally, in section 5 we look at 
how the effectiveness of welfare state policies aimed at reducing poverty 
and increasing social mobility are dependent on the political power and 
economic behaviours of the wealthy. 
2 Underestimating inequality 
Studies of public support and preferences for redistributive policies have 
traditionally focused on how such preferences depend on the actual level of 
inequality or social mobility in society. More recently, however, the 
literature has emphasised the role of perceived inequality, rather than 
actual inequality, on shaping attitudes towards and demand for 
redistribution. This section examines the importance of this distinction for 
generating the resources necessary to tackle poverty in an unequal society. 
 
Redistributive policies rely on public support from the electorate, and 
if public support is low then this can constrain the effective amount of 
resources available for redistribution and social expenditure available to 
tackle poverty. Several theoretical papers have explored this dependence 
of redistributive parameters on social beliefs linked to attitudes towards 
redistribution (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; 
Alesina et al., 2012). For example, the dependence of marginal tax rates 
on beliefs about the importance of non-meritocratic factors in determining 
individual wages (Kuhn, 2016). Empirically, among OECD countries, 
preferences for more redistribution are significantly positively correlated 
with higher levels of observed public social expenditure, and significantly 
negatively correlated with income inequality after taxes and transfers 
(Kuhn, 2012). In the UK, social security and related policies have largely 
been in line with public attitudes (Hills, 2002). Influencing preferences and 
mobilising support for redistribution therefore appear essential in 
generating the resources needed to tackle poverty through the tax and 
transfer system. However, in order to use this relationship to understand 
the potential mechanism linking the level of inequality with poverty, we 
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must ask whether, and how, the prevailing level of inequality itself affects 
these public preferences for redistribution. 
 
The standard median voter theorem in relation to democracies would 
predict that income inequality and redistribution should be positively 
related (Romer, 1975; Meltzer and Richard, 1981). If inequality is high such 
that the pivotal median voter is below the mean level of income in society, 
then since this voter would benefit from a more progressive tax and 
transfer system, the pivotal vote would be in favour of greater 
redistribution. Through this mechanism, more resources would also be 
expected to be available for tackling poverty. Empirical evidence supporting 
this theorem has been mixed, however. Using cross-sectional data for 56 
countries in the post-war period, Perotti (1996) finds that inequality 
(measured by the combined share of the third and fourth quintiles, or the 
"middle class share") was not significantly correlated to redistribution 
proxied by the maximum marginal tax rate. However, in democracies, 
inequality was positively correlated to greater social transfers as measured 
by social security and welfare expenditure. Milanovic (2000) finds using a 
longitudinal sample of 24 countries, that more unequal countries 
(measured by the Gini coefficient of market incomes) do redistribute more 
to the poor as measured by the income share gain of the lower half ("the 
poor") and lowest quintile ("the very poor"). 
 
An empirical example to the contrary is that income inequality is 
higher in the US than in continental Western European countries, yet 
redistributive policies and legislation are much more extensive in Europe. 
Niehues (2014) points to the importance of beliefs and perceptions of 
inequality, rather than the actual level of inequality, as a way of 
understanding this empirical deviation from the median voter theorem's 
predicted outcome. The author shows that a large proportion of Europeans, 
especially in former socialist countries, perceive inequality to be higher than 
actual inequality in their countries, justifying the need for redistributive 
policies. On the other hand, those in the US substantially underestimate 
the extent of inequality and are more likely to believe they live in a middle-
class society (a distribution with most people in the middle, few at the 
bottom and a long tail at the top) than many European countries, even 
though income inequality in the US is significantly higher. In this study, 
perceived inequality explains 56% of the cross-country variation in 
redistributive preferences. 
 
Further studies show that perceptions of inequality do not in general 
tend to align with the true level of inequality. In the UK, Hills (2005) and 
Pahl et al. (2007) have shown that the extent of wage inequality at the top 
is much greater than perceived. In the US, people's perceptions also tend 
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to be biased downwards, so that there is a systematic underestimation of 
the true level of inequality (Norton and Ariely, 2011). As mentioned, 
Niehues (2014) shows that opposite is true in continental Europe, with 
perceptions tending to be biased towards overestimating rather than 
underestimating inequality. According to an Indonesian survey by the 
World Bank (Indrakesuma et al., 2015), on average Indonesians believed 
the country’s richest 20 percent of people earned 38 percent of all income, 
roughly equal to what they believed the bottom 60 percent earned. This 
equates to a Gini coefficient of around 0.3 – lower than most other countries 
in the world. The actual Indonesian Gini coefficient is significantly higher at 
0.4, which is similar to the United States and higher than most countries. 
The study also showed that on average, Indonesians would have preferred 
the level of inequality to be even lower than the perceived level. 
Preferences for lower levels of inequality were associated with support for 
increasing social protection, and this provides additional support to the 
small number of other studies that currently exist on the effect of correcting 
people’s misperceptions of inequality. 
 
This recent stream of research shows that what matters in shaping 
people's attitudes and levels of support for redistribution is not necessarily 
the prevailing level of inequality in a society, but perceptions of the level of 
inequality. This is important, as the decisions of policy-makers are strongly 
influenced by public opinion and the level of public support for certain policy 
options. If people are unaware of how unequal their society is, then it is 
likely that public support for redistributive policies is reduced as people 
perceive policy-makers to be addressing a smaller issue than really exists. 
In the extreme, if inequality rises but people think that inequality has 
decreased, then people may in fact seek less redistribution than before 
(Windsteiger, 2017). With less redistribution, fewer poor households would 
receive the support they need to maintain an acceptable standard of living. 
The weight of the evidence shows that correcting people's underestimations 
of inequality leads to greater support for redistribution and greater support 
for taxing the wealth of the richest in society (Cruces et al., 2013; Kuziemko 
et al., 2015). Individuals who perceive inequality to be high are more likely 
to support redistributive policies and progressive taxation (Kuhn, 2016). 
 
The bias in perceived inequality may in part be generated through 
two other biases (Engelhardt and Wagener, 2014). The first is that people 
tend to think they are closer to the middle of the income distribution than 
they really are (Runciman, 1966). The second is that people tend to 
overestimate the degree of upward social mobility in society (Bjørnskov et 
al., 2013). On the first point, evidence suggests that there is only a weak 
correlation between people’s actual place in the income distribution and 
where they perceived themselves to be, since individuals tend to place 
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themselves subjectively in the middle of the income distribution despite 
coming from the full range of socioeconomic backgrounds (Evans and 
Kelley, 2004; Bamfield and Horton, 2009; Indrakesuma et al., 2015). On 
the second point, the Prospect of Upward Mobility (POUM) hypothesis 
predicts that people with current incomes below average may not support 
redistribution if social mobility is high because they believe that they or 
their children will move up the distribution in the future, when progressive 
taxation will hurt them (Piketty, 1995; Bénabou and Ok, 2001). With 
overoptimistic perceptions of upward social mobility, individuals may fail to 
support redistributive policies that would be beneficial to them. As an 
example, low support for inheritance tax may stem from overestimations 
of the fortunes that individuals may leave to their children, whereas in 
reality few people are wealthy enough to pay inheritance tax but many 
would benefit from it (Maxwell, 2004). 
 
If people in low-income households perceive themselves to better off 
than they really are, and similarly if the rich do not perceive themselves to 
be as well off, then neither will view inequality to be as urgent an issue as 
the actual situation might warrant. A study of attitudes in the UK from 
1983-2011 for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation found that "Attitudes to 
welfare spending bear little relation to economic circumstances, even 
among those groups most likely to be affected by them and to require 
welfare provision as a result" (Clery et al., 2013). If inequality increases 
but this has no effect on people's perceptions of their own personal 
positions, then the poor do not realise the scale and direction of changing 
disparity and are therefore less motivated to push for greater redistribution 
to address it. Likewise, the rich and political elite fail to notice this increase 
in inequality – or the extent of it – meaning their support for redistributive 
policies doesn’t increase accordingly, and neither are they held to account 
by those lower down the income distribution who are in poverty. Effectively 
communicating the true state of inequality to members of the public as well 
as policy-makers, and correcting misconceived underestimates of 
inequality would act as an important counteracting force to this mechanism 
linking inequality to constraints on support for redistribution. 
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3 Segregation and beliefs about the causes of poverty 
and inequality 
A further underlying mechanism for the biases discussed in the previous 
section may be that greater inequality leads to greater social segregation 
and polarisation, so that people with similar circumstances tend to 
associate only with one another. In the UK, growing income inequality in 
the latter part of the twentieth century was accompanied by increasing 
social and geographical segregation (Dorling and Rees, 2003; Dorling et al., 
2007). Figures 1 and 2 are taken from Dorling et al. (2007). Figure 1 shows 
graphically how poverty clustering, especially in urban areas, has increased 
from 1970 to 2000, as measured by the Breadline Britain (Gordon et al., 
2000) deprivation index. Meanwhile Figure 2 shows that wealthy 
households, as measured by households with sufficient total wealth to be 
liable to Inheritance Tax, have tended to concentrate in already wealthy 
areas on the outskirts of major cities. The evidence therefore points 
towards increasing polarisation, where rich and poor now live further apart. 
Bailey et al. (2013) find that in England, this rising spatial segregation 
appears to have eroded support for redistribution, which may in turn further 
increase levels of inequality in a feedback loop. 
 
Figure 1. Geographical patterns of poverty 1970-2000, as measured 
by the Breadline Britain (Gordon et al., 2000) deprivation index 
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Figure 2. Geographical patterns of asset-wealthy households 1980-
2000, as measured by households with sufficient total wealth to be 
liable to Inheritance Tax 
 
 
Evidence from the US and many other developed countries has also 
shown that changes in social segregation are strongly positively associated 
with changes in inequality (OECD, 1998; Watson, 2009; Reardon and 
Bischoff, 2011). As Bailey et al. (2013) note, the two are linked through 
the operation of the housing market – the rise in geographical segregation 
reflects the increased ability of higher income groups to outbid lower 
income groups to compete for more 'desirable' neighbourhoods as the 
income differential between these groups increases with increasing 
inequality (Cheshire et al., 2003). 
 
The advent of social media has seen this segregation take on not only 
physical form in terms of neighbourhood and occupational segregation by 
income and social class, for example, but increasingly segregation in terms 
of who we interact with online (Bakshy et al., 2015). This has been 
particularly pronounced for segregation by political engagement, with social 
media users becoming digitally siloed into interactions with others who 
share the same political views (Garrett, 2009; Krasodomski-Jones, 2016). 
Misjudgements within large portions of society of the Brexit outcome in the 
UK and Trump's presidential election in the US have become often-cited 
examples of this social media "echo chamber effect" (Quattrociocchi et al., 
2016). 
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Importantly for mobilising support for redistribution and tackling 
poverty, increased polarisation of political attitudes through high inequality 
leads to misunderstanding and erosion of awareness of those who live in 
very different circumstances from one another (Bailey et al., 2013). If 
growing segregation between rich and poor erodes the empathy and 
reciprocity that underpins redistribution through tax and transfer systems, 
then social segregation may act as a feedback mechanism, undermining 
support for redistributive policies and further reinforcing high levels of 
inequality. Conversely, such a feedback mechanism means that societies 
with smaller pre-tax income differences may be characterised by a less 
segregated structure, making it more likely that larger transfers will be 
supported by voters valuing redistribution for its insurance value and 
regard for the welfare of others (Bowles and Gintis, 2000; Bjorvatn and 
Cappelen, 2003). 
 
In addition to reducing support for redistribution by biasing 
perceptions of the level of inequality, social segregation can generate a 
more direct animosity effect that influences people's attitudes to 
redistribution and poverty (Hills, 2014). People become more susceptible 
to portrayals in the popular media and by politicians of a population "divided 
into those who benefit from the welfare state and those who pay into it, 
despite the evidence painting a rather different picture" (Hills, 2017). Even 
among the poor, Luttmer (2001) shows that people are less likely to 
support redistribution if they live around poor people of a different race. 
This might suggest an additional dimension of resource constraints 
generated through not only economic and social segregation but also racial 
segregation. 
 
Evidence shows that the view that welfare generosity encourages 
dependence became more prevalent under New Labour (Clery et al., 2013), 
which positioned itself as less pro-welfare during the late-1990s. It has 
been argued that the attitudes of Labour supporters in particular followed 
in response to Labour's stance to this and other issues (Curtice, 2010). 
Georgiadis and Manning (2012) argue that the main change in attitudes 
that can account for the falling demand for redistribution in the UK from 
1983 to 2004 is a greater belief in the importance of incentives as proxied 
by attitudes about the disincentives to work associated with the welfare 
state. This divisive sense of "them" and "us" allows the political ruling class 
to be more willing to make spending cuts that are detrimental to "them" – 
the income-poor and politically vulnerable portion of society (Hills, 2014). 
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4 Fiscal decentralisation and local governance 
In addition to generating redistributive constraints through geographical 
and social segregation, inequality may generate additional impacts on 
poverty reduction efforts when control over tax-setting and expenditure 
decisions are decentralised. In theory, more freedom to make spending 
decisions locally may help to reduce poverty by bringing decisions 
regarding public expenditures "closer to the people" (Oates, 1999, p. 1123), 
and therefore result in a more efficient allocation of resources to the needy. 
There is evidence that shares of health and education services in total 
government expenditures increase with fiscal decentralisation (Arze del 
Granado et al., 2005), which might be expected to have a positive effect 
on the welfare of the poor (Martinez-Vazquez, 2001). However, in terms of 
poverty reduction there is evidence suggesting that higher fiscal 
decentralisation, measured as the share of subnational expenditures over 
total government expenditures, is not in general associated with lower 
poverty, and is even associated with higher poverty (Sepulveda and 
Martinez-Vazquez, 2011). One of the reasons for this may be due to the 
movement of individuals between areas when inequality and geographical 
disparities in affluence are high. This mechanism will now be discussed in 
greater detail. 
 
According to the classic "Decentralisation Theorem" proposed by 
Oates (1972), fiscal decentralisation improves social welfare. The argument 
is that local decisions over taxation and public expenditures allow for a 
better fit of the preferences of constituents, and therefore for efficiency 
gains to society. This literature argues that the larger the share of local 
expenditures that is financed through local revenue collections, the more 
accountable local authorities will become to their constituents to make 
responsible and efficient tax and spending decisions. However, in the 
presence of high inequality within an area, attempts to redistribute locally 
by increasing tax rates for the rich may eventually lead to these individuals 
migrating outwards to areas with lower taxes while less well-off individuals 
from neighbouring jurisdictions migrate inwards. As a result, the costs of 
redistributive programmes may increase while the local tax base, making 
poverty reduction through such redistributive policies unsustainable. 
 
To avoid this, local governments may engage in tax competition, 
leading to a 'race to the bottom' as local governments reduce their tax rates 
to avoid further erosion of the tax base (Wildasin, 2003; Wilson, 1999). If 
more affluent areas cut local taxes in this way to retain or attract wealthy 
households to the area, then this could displace less well-off households 
and produce a negative cycle of further geographical segregation and 
concentrations of poverty and wealth. Additionally, when inequality is high, 
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decentralised decision-making over business and council tax rates may 
further entrench poverty because more deprived areas typically have less 
ability to attract wealthy tax-payers and businesses to raise local tax 
revenue. For example, local income taxes are used in US cities such as New 
York and Philadelphia. Yet for deprived cities, such as Detroit, economic 
stagnation and high levels of deprivation mean that tax revenues decline 
further and local government faces financial crisis (Davey and Walsh, 2013). 
 
By international standards, the UK has a highly centralised system of 
taxation and expenditure, with the exception of business and council tax. 
As of 2011 the proportion of tax set at a local or regional level was less 
than 2.5 percent of GDP, compared with 15.9 percent in Sweden, 15.3 
percent in Canada, 10.9 percent in Germany, and 5.8 percent in France 
(Parliament. House of Commons, 2014). Nevertheless, the distribution of 
income, poverty and wealth has consistently shown an unequal 
geographical distribution across the UK (refer back to Figure 1 (Dorling et 
al., 2007)). While local councils currently keep up to half of local business 
rates, full devolution planned for the year 2020 means that councils will 
receive full control of this revenue stream. With this move towards greater 
fiscal decentralisation, the risk of local authorities engaging in competitive 
cutting of taxes to attract companies increases. As the chancellor George 
Osborne has said: “Any local area will be able to cut business rates as much 
as they like to win new jobs and generate wealth. It’s up to them to judge 
whether they can afford it." (Wintour, 2015). If the implication of this for 
the unequal economic landscape of the UK is that those areas least able to 
afford it are least able to compete under decentralised setting of business 
rates, then this will have negative impacts on poverty and geographical 
segregation. 
 
It has also been argued that decentralisation may serve as a vehicle 
for making cuts to public service provision, since devolved spending cuts 
tend to happen faster than ones administered centrally (Neville, 2015). In 
the period of ongoing austerity in the UK following the 2008 recession, the 
greatest percentage cuts in real levels of spending resources have been to 
the lowest-income district councils as measured by the government's 2010 
Index of Multiple Deprivation (Hastings et al., 2015). On the opposite end 
of the spectrum, the smallest cuts have been to the most affluent district 
councils. Analysing 50 countries in the years 2007, 2009 and 2011, 
Aizenman and Jinjarak (2012) provide evidence that countries with higher 
levels of economic inequality tend to adjust to economic crises by 
decreasing public expenditure to minimise their adjustment burden rather 
than by raising taxes. This shifts cuts onto an already vulnerable portion of 
society (MacLeavy, 2011). 
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To sum up, there exist channels through which decentralisation may 
interact with spatial inequalities to help or hinder poverty reduction. While 
greater freedom over local spending decisions means that resources may 
be allocated more efficiently to where it is most needed in a community, 
this is countered by the risk that inequalities manifested in geographical 
disparities create tax competition. If lower tax rates are used to attract 
higher income households and businesses to an area while the most 
deprived areas are unable to afford such behaviour, then these areas are 
placed at a further disadvantage. For decentralisation mechanisms to work 
in favour of poverty reduction, decision-makers in local government need 
to be made responsive to the demands of their constituents. As we will 
explore in the next section, however, the political influence of wealthier 
constituents is often greater than that of the poor, and so the demands of 
the economically vulnerable may not ultimately be met. 
  
13 
 
5 Interdependence of the state and the wealthy 
The discussion in Sections 2 and 3 focused on the role of people's 
attitudes, beliefs and perceptions in shaping resource constraints on 
redistribution – these stem from subjective views of inequality and poverty 
that may or may not align with reality. Equally as important for considering 
such resource constraints are people's actual observed behaviour in 
response to the design of the tax and transfer system itself. Examples 
include the rich using financial power to buy better education, shape 
political or public views through buying media outlets and think tanks 
(Reich, 2012), or responding to more progressive taxation by shifting 
income flows and assets to less taxable vehicles (Allingham and Sandmo, 
1972; Cowell and P. F. Gordon, 1988; Alstadsaeter et al., 2017). While 
those at the top of the income distribution are particularly well-placed to 
respond to tax changes to circumvent any personal loss, poverty alleviation 
through the tax and transfer system must work within the constraints of 
the available resources – which depends on tax revenue and by extension 
the behaviour of the wealthy. This section focuses on the interaction 
between the state and the wealthy at different levels of inequality, and how 
the behaviour of one depends on the other in ways that shape the amount 
of resources available and how effectively they can be used to address 
poverty. 
 
It may be possible that higher market inequality can mean that the 
size of the redistributive budget from income tax is larger, since larger tax 
revenues can in principle be extracted from the higher concentrations of 
income and wealth at the top of the distribution. This could point to an 
argument that greater inequality could in fact be beneficial for poverty 
reduction if transfers are funded progressively. But equally, taxes can be 
designed to raise just as much revenue from a more equal distribution of 
market incomes. Furthermore, this depends on the whether the incentives 
and disincentives provided by the tax and transfer system affect people's 
behaviour further up the income distribution, and whether these people 
mobilise their political influence to shape policies that are attractive to them 
to the detriment of the less well-off. 
 
5.1 Inequality, targeting and poverty reduction 
 
For a given degree of inequality, efforts to change the level of income 
poverty by changing the degree of redistribution through taxes and 
transfers can be achieved in different ways, requiring differing amounts of 
resources. A key debate over how resources can best be used for poverty 
alleviation and redistribution concerns universal versus targeted welfare 
systems (Titmuss, 1968). Targeted systems select beneficiaries for cash 
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transfers or in-kind services based on economic status or resources, such 
as labour market status or income level. On the other hand, universalistic 
cash transfers or services are available to all or to large categories of 
citizens or residents, such as children or pensioners, without the 
requirement of economic means-testing. In practice, however, the design 
of some categories can result in these universal transfers being 
concentrated in low income households. 
 
The effectiveness of universalistic compared to targeted 
redistribution in tackling poverty has been a strongly contested issue in the 
literature (Marx et al., 2013). Poverty reduction policies could in theory be 
very narrowly targeted – for instance, raising the incomes of those below 
the poverty line, but doing so in a way that has little or no impact on 
inequalities amongst those above it. In a mechanical sense, this targeted 
approach would be the most efficient way of tackling poverty in an unequal 
society through redistribution in the short term. However, a targeted 
system is more likely to cultivate the politically unattractive perception that 
the non-poor contributors to such a system are excluded from its benefits, 
notwithstanding the fact that these groups are not mutually exclusive at 
different points in time as poverty risk changes over the lifetime. A more 
universalistic cash transfer system with a wider set of beneficiaries may 
attract more support and a more generous tax base, emphasising the role 
of redistribution as insurance required by everyone at different stages of 
life against periods of income vulnerability (Esping-Anderson and Myles, 
2009; Kenworthy, 2011). Particularly in highly unequal societies where 
public attitudes may be divided into "them" and "us" (Hills, 2014), this 
emphasis on the "piggy bank" rather than the "Robin Hood" role of 
redistribution implies that a universal cash transfer system may attract 
greater electoral support and therefore generosity. However, the more 
diffused spread of transfer payments means that the degree of poverty 
alleviation is constrained. A trade-off may therefore exist between the 
proportion of funding going to the worst-off and the overall level of funding 
available. 
 
Gelbach and Pritchett (1995) use a theoretical model to investigate 
this trade-off, asking the question “is more for the poor less for the poor?”. 
They find that when the budget is taken as fixed, full use of targeted 
transfers is optimal for poverty alleviation and overall social welfare and 
equality. However, when the budget is determined through majority voting 
with the policymaker choosing the share of the budget to be spent on 
targeted and non-targeted transfers, the optimal degree of targeting is zero. 
The seminal empirical study by Korpi and Palme (1998) supports the theory 
that such a trade-off in budget size exists in a "paradox of targeting". They 
find that universalistic approaches to redistribution are associated with 
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greater levels of public spending and higher degrees of redistribution and 
poverty reduction compared to targeted approaches. Later studies have 
challenged Korpi and Palme's finding, however (Kenworthy, 2011; Marx et 
al., 2013; Van Lancker et al., 2015), and yet further studies find support 
for Korpi and Palme's original conclusion (McKnight, 2015). Despite a 
considerable amount of up-to-date research around targeted and 
universalistic approaches, the evidence does not clearly point to the 
advantages of one approach outweighing the other. 
 
In targeted approaches, an additional issue arises regarding the 
efficient use of resources in tackling poverty. In more unequal and 
segregated societies, the social stigma attached to claiming means-tested 
cash transfers may be amplified in comparison to more equal societies. This 
means that the poor face an additional barrier of indignity, over and above 
the means-testing process itself, in order to receive the transfers necessary 
for an acceptable standard of living. If the barrier of social stigma results 
in benefits being left unclaimed, then the ability of targeted programmes 
to reduce poverty is hampered for any given level of available resources 
(Mkandawire, 2007; Sen, 1995). Such stigma and the picture commonly 
painted in public discourse of the "underserving poor" may stem from the 
negative political rhetoric that can often accompany policies targeting the 
poor (Katz, 1989). In addition to lowering benefit take-up, the additional 
effect on wider society may be to reduce taxpayer support and generosity, 
further constraining poverty reduction efforts by limiting the amount of 
resources available for redistribution as discussed in the previous 
paragraph. 
 
Beyond cash transfers, resources are also required for driving poverty 
reduction through social investment and in-kind provision of education, for 
example. These types of policies aim at equalising opportunities and are 
therefore designed to affect the pre-distribution of income, as opposed to 
cash transfers which aim at changing the distribution of income and poverty 
post-taxes and transfers. The extent to which policy can reduce poverty 
through funding education and promoting long run social mobility is, again, 
limited by the amount of resources required. Such policies need to reduce 
the link between household resources and educational attainment. 
However, expansion in higher education and increases in average 
attainment do not necessarily reduce poverty or increase social mobility 
(McKnight, forthcoming). As McKnight observes: 
 
"As average levels of educational attainment increase and 
governments strive to reduce education inequalities at secondary and 
undergraduate levels, better-off families will seek to ensure that their 
children continue to secure the best jobs and highest incomes. They do this 
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by maximising their children's chance of achieving the highest level of 
qualifications and acquiring non-cognitive/character skills which are 
rewarded in the labour market. This can involve ensuring that their children 
attend the highest performing schools, possibly attend private fee-paying 
schools, or paying for additional tuition. Parents also play an important role 
in assisting with homework, organisation, examination preparation, 
guidance and by creating a conducive home learning environment, and 
providing education enrichment activities and experiences. The outcome 
becomes a 'race' both between families, and between wealthy parents and 
the state, with government seeking to narrow gaps in educational 
attainment and financially advantaged parents trying to maintain them." 
(McKnight, forthcoming) 
 
Empirical evidence supports the key importance of parental 
background and resources on children’s outcomes (Ermisch et al., 2012). 
In the UK, the wealthiest parents are positioned to secure not only the 
highest quality education and levels of attainment, but also connections 
and job opportunities are not open to the children of poorer families 
(Lindley and Machin, 2012). This effect is likely to be magnified with higher 
economic inequality and greater concentrations of wealth. While evidence 
shows that public provision of, in particular, early childhood education can 
reduce the gradient between parental socio-economic status and child 
achievement (Ludwig and Miller, 2007; Heckman, 2008; Almond and Currie, 
2010), private resources often far outstrip what the public sector can offer 
in societies with high economic and social inequality (McKnight et al., 2016). 
Figure 3, taken from (Heckman, 2008), shows the return to a marginal 
increase in investment at different stages of the life cycle, from the 
perspective of the beginning of life. The vast majority of children of poor 
families rely on state provision at each stage of education, which is limited 
in the extent to which it can compete with the private financial resources 
of the wealthy. With the government constrained in their ability to equalise 
opportunities and increase social mobility through educational attainment, 
such inequalities can mean that poverty is entrenched over time. 
 
On the other side of the same issue, the cost of not intervening early when 
young people experience difficulties in life can be most costly for the most 
deprived portions of society. These costs manifest themselves indirectly 
through school absence, children's social care, youth economic inactivity, 
crime and crime and anti-social behaviour, child injuries and mental health 
problems, and youth substance misuse. It is estimated that the total UK 
budget dedicated to dealing with these issues is £16.6 billion annually 
(Chowdry and Fitzsimons, 2016). 
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Figure 3. Return to a dollar invested at different ages (Heckman, 
2008) 
 
 
  
 
Figure 4. Heat maps of late intervention spend per person and local 
indices of multiple deprivation (Chowdry and Fitzsimons, 2016) 
 
 
 
In addition to the general problem of requiring a huge quantity of 
resources overall, Figure 4 (Chowdry and Fitzsimons, 2016) shows that the 
amount spent on late intervention per capita is linked to the level of 
deprivation in that area. The heat maps show a tendency for the same local 
areas to appear in a darker colour on both maps. In this unequal landscape, 
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constraints on government resources may mean that high costs of late 
intervention in the most deprived areas risks neglecting preventative early 
intervention approaches, which have strong evidence of reducing the 
likelihood of poor long‐term outcomes for vulnerable children. 
 
A similar argument can be made for the provision of private versus 
public healthcare. For public health services such as the NHS, resource 
constraints mean that many treatments cannot be funded, while delays for 
popular treatments can impair long-term recovery. For people who rely 
solely on the NHS and cannot afford alternative private treatment, this can 
result in more lost work days that cannot be afforded, and increased 
personal cost and financial risk for the individual. In the long-run, this can 
also generate further costs to the state. Economic inequality allows for a 
dual healthcare system, where the less well-off rely on the funding-
constrained NHS and the rich can pay for swift access to private treatments 
either domestically or abroad. A report by Breast Cancer Now and Prostate 
Cancer UK (2016) finds that thousands of NHS cancer patients in the UK 
are unable to access innovative treatments being made available in five 
countries with similar wealth but lower disposable Gini income inequality 
(Germany, France, Australia, Canada and Sweden). With some cancer 
patients turning to crowdfunding to pay for private medical treatment not 
available on the NHS (The Telegraph, 2017), inequalities in healthcare 
access clearly seem to place financial burdens on those who cannot afford 
it. Wide disparities in income and wealth mean that public health services 
are less able to keep up with the quality and extent of privately-purchased 
equivalents. Combined with the other constraints already discussed, this 
provides an additional dimension to the limitations faced by the 
government in their ability to equalise outcomes and achieve poverty 
reduction. 
 
5.2 Wealth, political power and tax evasion 
 
We have seen that inequality propagates the concentration and 
accumulation of financial and human capital through a divided education 
and health system, in a way that constrains upward social mobility for the 
poor. Furthermore, high inequality can generate concentrations of political 
power among the well-off, influencing the political agenda in ways that 
disregard the interests of the poor and provide a double standard for the 
wealthy elite. Christiano (2012) identifies four mechanisms that turn 
money into political power. These are: (1) the ultra-wealthy buying support 
for self-interested causes by funding political parties and individuals 
through campaign financing; (2) political agendas representing upper-
middle and upper-class interests who are more likely to be donors to 
political candidates; (3) influencing opinion through buying media outlets 
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and providing financial backing for lobbyists and ideology-driven think tank 
research; and (4) using financial power to influence the behaviour of 
corporations to circumvent policies of democratically elected government. 
As pointed out by Robeyns (2016), wealthier individuals who have "excess 
money" are able, and more likely, to spend money on these various 
mechanisms that translate money into political power. In contrast, the poor 
necessarily spend the majority of their available resources on food or basic 
utilities, and hence have no surplus to spend on acquiring political influence. 
Robeyns argues that through these mechanisms, wealth undermines the 
political equality of citizens, resulting in the erosion of the political position 
of the least well-off. 
 
With greater inequality and higher concentrations of top incomes and 
wealth, the rich also gain greater means of concealing their assets, 
reducing the potential for governments to tackle poverty due to their 
impact on government revenues. The recent leaks of micro-data from 
offshore financial institutions HSBC Switzerland ("Swiss leaks") and 
Mossack Fonseca ("Panama Papers") have sparked much coverage in the 
popular media on the issue of tax evasion (The Guardian, 2017). There is 
evidence that the probability of hiding wealth offshore rises very steeply 
within the top 1% of the income distribution, with the ultra-wealthy evading 
on average nearly a third of their due tax (Alstadsaeter et al., 2017). The 
richest 0.01 percent of households, including those who hold over £31 
million in assets, evade paying 30 percent of their taxes on average. 
Zucman (2015) estimates that 80 percent of assets are undeclared globally, 
and that the annual losses to governments from uncollected income, 
inheritance and wealth taxes are close to $200 billion. The expectation of a 
larger redistributive budget to tackle poverty may therefore not materialise 
in comparison to a counterfactual scenario with the same redistributive 
system but lower concentrations of wealth and evasive power at the top of 
the distribution. 
 
There is an argument that individuals are more likely to increase 
evasion after a tax rise when they feel that public goods and services are 
under-provided (Cowell and P. F. Gordon, 1988). The explanation for this 
is that if the tax rise is used to fund government provision, then this may 
make individuals feel better off and therefore more willing to gamble with 
higher tax evasion (Cowell and P. F. Gordon, 1988). This argument would 
predict that if government provision begins from a low baseline, then 
attempts to fund expansions in services through tax increases will be 
hampered by higher tax evasion, to the detriment of the poor who rely 
more on such services. Individuals may also be more likely to increase 
evasion if these goods and services are not seen as representing good value 
for tax contributions. When inequality is such that there are very high 
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concentrations of wealth, as is currently the case in the UK, the ultra-
wealthy are unlikely to take account of the provision of public goods and 
services in their tax evasion decisions if they prefer to use private 
alternatives. Therefore, while quality of public service provision matters for 
tackling poverty, it is unlikely to affect the constraints on financing from 
tax evasion by the ultra-wealthy. 
 
Wealth inequality is higher than income inequality, yet most OECD 
countries either do not have or have abolished wealth taxes due to the risk 
of wealth and capital flight to low-tax countries (Joumard et al., 2012). 
With low taxes on wealth, the wealth and asset accumulation of the ultra-
wealthy are protected and unavailable for redistributive purposes. This not 
only limits the resources available to the government for tackling poverty, 
but also encourages unsustainable spending patterns and the taking on of 
excessive debt by those who cannot afford it. This so-called "Hello 
magazine effect" arises from growing inequality that makes the lifestyles 
of the rich ever more visible and desirable in the mass media, encouraging 
emulation of the living standards and consumption patterns of the wealthy 
(OECD, 2008). The resulting "trickle-down consumption" effect (Bertrand 
and Morse, 2013) amplifies the negative implications of high wealth 
inequality – not only does low wealth taxation limit the size redistributive 
budgets to help those on low incomes, but this inequality also encourages 
those people to further weaken their economic positions by taking on debt. 
This hidden component of poverty, which standard measures of income 
poverty underestimate (Scott and Pressman, 2013), introduces a dynamic 
component to poverty and requires further resources to tackle in the future. 
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6 Conclusion 
In summary, we have seen that there are a variety of channels through 
which economic inequality may generate pressures on the resources 
available to tackle poverty. Some of these channels have a subjective basis, 
such as subconscious biases in how people perceive the economic 
distribution and their place in it, and conscious beliefs and attitudes towards 
the poor and towards redistribution. Some of these subjective channels 
stem from objective circumstances, such as social and geographical 
segregation. Yet further channels work through observed decisions and 
behaviour, in particular those of governments and wealthy individuals. The 
level of inequality in society affects the resource constraints on government 
decisions regarding welfare targeting, decentralisation, budget cuts, and 
representation of voter interests. These in turn can all impact on the 
effectiveness of poverty alleviation. The level of inequality is also reflected 
in the power of those at the top of the economic distribution to influence 
these government decisions in ways that constrain its capacity to 
redistribute. This could be directly through funding particular political 
agendas, and indirectly through withholding government revenue through 
tax evasion. While the net effect of these channels on efforts to tackle 
poverty are not clear-cut, it seems on balance that high inequality tips 
many of these channels in a direction that constrains the redistributive 
powers of governments and their poverty alleviation efforts. 
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